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bstract: Concern with intergenerational justice has long 
been a focus of economics. This essay considers the effort, 
over the last three decades, to quantify generational fiscal 
burdens using label-free fiscal gap and generational accounting. It 
also points out that government debt – the conventional metric for 
assessing generational fiscal justice – has no grounding in economic 
theory. Instead, official debt is the result of economically arbitrary 
government labelling decisions: whether to call receipts “taxes” rather 
than “borrowing” and whether to call payments “transfer payments” 
rather than “debt service”. Via their choice of words, governments 
decide which obligations to put on, and which to keep off, the books. 
The essay also looks to the future of generational fiscal-justice analysis. 
Rapid computational advances are permitting economists to under-
stand not just direct government intergenerational redistribution, but 
also how such policies impact the economy that future generations 
will inherit.
Keywords: Generational Accounting, Fiscal Gap, Deficit Delusion
Intergenerational justice and its measurement
Justice, the saying goes, is in the eyes of the beholders. But when 
it comes to intergenerational justice, future generations aren’t here 
to assess, let alone contest their treatment. Consequently, it falls to 
current generations to consider the welfare of their descendants. 
This is exceedingly and conveniently difficult. No one can foretell 
the future. Unfortunately, this provides a ready excuse for many 
to ignore not just central tendencies, but worst-case outcomes.
Yet the generationally myopic, wilfully ignorant and self-interest-
ed are in the minority. Most of us care for our progeny. And since 
our offspring’s fates are co-determined with those of our contem-
poraries, most of us recognise the collective skin, if not potential-
ly comingled DNA, we have in the intergenerational game. This 
limits our capacity to look the other way as the climate changes, 
nuclear weapons proliferate, fiscal obligations grow, infrastructure 
is degraded, education is diminished, inequality rises… In short, 
our common maternal and paternal instincts lead most of us to 
ask and try to answer the question “What are we doing for sure or 
for maybe to our children?”
This natural concern for our descendants has been inscribed 
through the ages in covenants, compacts, constitutions and case 
law, all of which were written to extend from generation to gene-
ration. Indeed, generational commitments covering the infinite 
horizon show up in Genesis 9:12, which states, “This is the sign of 
the covenant which I am making between Me and you and every 
living creature that is with you, for all successive generations.”
Generational responsibility is a common civic as well as religious 
theme. In his Farewell Address, President Washington admon-
ished us to “not ungenerously [throw] upon posterity the burden 
[of debts] which we ourselves ought to bear.” President Jefferson 
wrote, “It is incumbent on every generation to pay its own debts 
as it goes.” President Lincoln proclaimed, “The fiery trial through 
which we pass will light us down in honor or dishonor, to the 
latest generation.” And President Kennedy stated, “We… shall 
be remembered either as part of the generation that turned this 
 planet into a flaming funeral pyre or the generation that met its 
vow ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’.”
Unfortunately, the distance between generational rhetoric and 
generational action seems to be growing, particularly in heter-
ogeneous societies whose inhabitants don’t view other people’s 
children as their own, let alone their responsibility. The tug of 
genetics, the dictates of morality, and the economics of collective 
benefit are, it seems, in constant conflict with each generation’s 
craven instinct to take as you go – the habit of each generation to 
extract the maximum possible from the next.
Intergenerational versus intragenerational justice
The focus of this short essay on the measurement of intergen-
erational justice does not in any way negate the importance of 
measuring intragenerational justice. Intergenerational justice 
looks across those born at different dates. Intragenerational jus-
tice looks across members of a given cohort. A climate policy that 
permits sea levels to rise 100 feet over the next two centuries and 
drown a major share of the earth’s population, if not destroy all 
human life, represents generational injustice. A healthcare policy 
that leaves the poorest members of each cohort with either no 
healthcare coverage or minimal healthcare coverage represents in-
tragenerational injustice. Both forms of injustice demand proper 
measurement. The focus of this essay on intergenerational, not 
intragenerational, justice does not elevate the former over the later 
as an ethical imperative.1
Assessing intergenerational justice from the current, not the 
original position
Generational justice seems best examined in terms of the distri-
bution at a given point in time in the expected lifetime well being 
(utility) of current and future generations. For current genera-
tions, expected lifetime utility incorporates their realised past 
 utility as well as their uncertain future utility.
Considering generational justice from our current (initial) con-
dition rather than from some Rawlsian original position is prac-
tically minded. The past can’t be changed. Bygone policy and 
economic shocks may have left current and future generations 
in dire straits, and those actions and outcomes may be viewed 
as both extremely unfair and unfortunate. But such assessments 
are irrelevant for forming today’s and tomorrow’s generational 
 policy, which are the only things we can control when it comes 
to generational justice. Stated differently, generational justice is 
not a metaphysical but a practical question. It concerns how we 
Measuring Intergenerational Justice
by Laurence J. Kotlikoff
A
It falls to current generations to consider the welfare of 
their descendants. This is exceedingly and conveniently 
difficult. No one can foretell the future. Unfortunately, 
this provides a ready excuse for many to ignore not just 
central tendencies, but worst-case outcomes.
Intergenerational Justice Review
2/2017
57
are going to act from this point forward, and what we can expect 
will happen based on those actions to current and future genera-
tions. This said, the set of initial conditions includes the realised 
past welfare of current generations. How well current generations 
fared in the past may matter for assessing the justice of current 
generation policy.
This does not suggest that the treatment of currently deceased 
generations is irrelevant to the bigger question of whether a coun-
try, over the course of time, has been unjust in its treatment of de-
ceased versus living and future generations. But such analyses are 
philosophical in nature. The practical economic question is the 
distribution of lifetime welfare among those whose welfare can 
still be changed, namely those now alive and those yet to be born. 
The role of the economist is not to declare particular generation-
al policies just or unjust. Economists are not ethicists and their 
social judgements are personal, not scientific. Instead, the role of 
economists is to analyse the implications of different generational 
policies on the distribution of generational welfare.
This said, knowing the levels and distribution of economic well-
being of past generations is a proper focus of economic analysis, 
and such findings will, presumably, inform policy judgements 
concerning the treatment of current and future generations. 
For example, a finding that past generations had much higher 
welfare than the current and future generations will be able to 
sustain, and that the reason reflects systematic redistribution to 
past generations from current and future generations, may lead 
policy-makers to decide to end ongoing policies that will con-
tinue to immiserate future generations at the benefit to current 
generations.
Economic theory and the measurement of generational justice
Economic theory is an indispensable guide for assessing genera-
tional justice in terms of the need to take policy actions given the 
current position or, as economists put it, the state of the world. 
There are two major strands of theory that go to the heart of gen-
erational justice. One is the intergenerational altruism model, 
clarified by Barro (1974), in which each generation’s welfare in-
cludes the welfare of its children. The other is the pure life-cycle 
model, which traces to the work of Fisher (1930), in which each 
generation is solely concerned with itself.
The intergenerational altruism model
Barro’s interlinkage of utility functions collapses (is isomorphic) to 
the Ramsey (1928) model of a single, infinitely-lived agent, where 
the agents’ future selves reference or represent their descendants. 
As Barro pointed out, this possibility – that each generation cares 
about the next, effectively making today’s generation care about 
all future generations – was originally suggested by David Ricardo 
in 1820 in his “Essay on the Funding System”. Ricardo’s sugges-
tion, which Barro elegantly exposited and elaborated, was that if 
today’s generations cared sufficiently for tomorrow’s, they would 
privately provide them the means to offset government intergen-
erational redistribution arising, for example, from the issuance of 
government debt.
Such operative intergenerational altruism lessens, if not fully 
eliminates, collective concern over intergenerational justice. The 
reason is that, given intergenerational altruism, current genera-
tions will automatically internalise the welfare of future genera-
tions and take actions to protect those generations. This is par-
ticularly the case in the presence of marriage. As Bernheim and 
Bagwell (1988) and Kotlikoff (1989) have independently showed, 
the marriage between two members of two altruistic clans will 
effectively altruistically link those clans. Bernheim and Bagwell 
make the further point that – given the extent of intermarriage 
across religious, national, ethnic, and racial lines – the probability 
of altruistic linkages across essentially all inhabitants on the planet 
rapidly approaches One. Since such global altruism would rule 
out wars, among other things, these papers represent a telling cri-
tique of the intergenerational altruism proposition.
Interestingly, Ricardo was himself dubious about the efficacy of 
intergenerational altruism. Although he raised such altruism as 
a theoretical possibility, he rejected its empirical relevance (in lit-
erally the next sentence)2. Specifically, he questioned the ability 
of current generations to correctly assess and appropriately offset 
government redistribution to them at the expense of their de-
scendants.
Kotlikoff et al. (2009) question a critical, implicit assumption un-
derlying Barro’s (1974) so-called “debt neutrality” result (i.e. that 
the government’s intergenerational redistribution will be neu-
tralised by private, intra-family transfers). They point out that it 
hinges critically on the assumption that agents within the extend-
ed family take each other’s transfers to them as given; i.e., there 
is no hold-up behaviour in which one family member says, for 
example, “I’m rejecting your gift if that’s all you are giving me.” 
In this context, in which extended family members differ on how 
much they weigh each other’s utility, Barro’s Nash equilibrium 
collapses with the resulting bargaining between family members 
depending on their threat points. Since intergenerational redistri-
bution by the government will change these threat points, such 
redistribution will have real impacts and alter the degree of inter-
generational justice, no matter how measured. Stated differently, 
Barro’s model requires both intergenerational altruism and par-
ticular game-theoretic behaviour. Without the latter, his propo-
sition of debt neutrality no longer holds.
Yet another critique of debt neutrality in the context of genera-
tional altruism is that raised by Laitner (1992). This and Laitner’s 
subsequent papers point out that if extended family members 
don’t perfectly share preferences, altruistic dynasties can be at 
corners with respect to making transfers to their members in the 
context of their facing earnings shocks, longevity risk, and other 
forms of risk. An example of preference differences is one-side 
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altruism in which parents care for the utility of their children, but 
children do not care about, or care less about, the utility of their 
parents. In this case, if children, for example, have sufficiently 
high earnings relative to their parents, the parents may be at a 
corner and make no transfers to their children notwithstanding 
government redistribution from children to parents, provided it 
isn’t large enough to move them away from their corner.
The life-cycle model
Fisher’s (1930) life-cycle consumption choice model rejects inter-
generational altruism outright in so far as it posits agents who care 
only for their own welfare. Although Fisher laid out the microeco-
nomics of intertemporal consumption choice, it took economists 
decades to begin examining how those micro decisions, coupled 
with generational policy, impacted macro outcomes and the dis-
tribution of welfare across current and future generations.
The first dynamic overlapping generation (OLG) model was de-
veloped in 1947 by Maurice Allais (1947). Samuelson (1958), 
who focused on the efficiency of overlapping economies, is the 
next major theoretical contribution to the OLG model. The third 
seminal OLG study is that of Diamond (1964). Diamond exam-
ined how government redistribution from young and future gen-
erations to current older generations (characterised in his study 
as “deficit policy”) would impact current and future generations, 
both directly in terms of their levels of taxation, and also indi-
rectly in terms of the wages and asset returns they would receive. 
In highlighting the intergenerational redistribution inherent in 
intergenerational fiscal policy, Diamond made intergenerational 
justice a major topic of economic analysis.
These early studies relied on simple two-period (youth and old 
age) models whose dynamics could be described in terms of a 
first-order, non-linear difference equation in the economy’s rel-
ative supply of capital to labour. The two-period OLG mod-
el became a workhorse in economics because of its ease of use 
and exposition. But it also stimulated interest in developing and 
solving more realistic models in which agents lived for periods 
corresponding to years. The goal was to understand the timing 
of annual economic responses to changes in policy as well as tech-
nology. The timing of those responses would also govern how 
particular policies impacted particular generations, i.e. how they 
would matter to the measurement of intergenerational justice.
But solving such models posed a major problem. Adding extra 
periods transformed the transition equation from first order to 
very high order. For example, a model in which adults live for up 
to 80 periods, from 20 to 100, produces a 160th order non-linear 
difference equation. Since mathematics offers nothing beyond ap-
proximate solutions to such problems, economists were stumped. 
The OLG model was, and arguably is, the core dynamic model 
of the profession, but no one could determine how it actually 
worked in real time. In the absence of a way to solve for realistic 
OLG transition paths, many economists, e.g. Tobin (1967), sim-
ply ignored the economy’s transition path and focused on the long 
run, i.e. on the steady states of realistic OLG models. Others, e.g. 
Summers (1981), “solved” the transition problem by assuming 
agents formed irrational expectations – specifically myopic expec-
tations under which agents always assume the economy to be in a 
steady state (i.e. that all future product and factor prices will equal 
prevailing values), even though they learn from one year to the 
next that the opposite is true.
In 1981, 34 years after Allais had produced the first OLG model, 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981) showed how the transition path of 
realistic OLG models could be solved on a computer using a Gauss-
Seidel-type algorithm, with inner and outer loops, that iterated 
over the economy’s entire transition path. Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1987) used their simulation method to study the wide variety of 
means by which governments redistribute across generations. They 
showed that, regardless of how governments characterise policies 
that take from the young and give to the old, such policies can 
affect major welfare losses on successive generations, both through 
their direct fiscal and indirect general-equilibrium feedback effects.
The Auerbach and Kotlikoff OLG simulation method was quickly 
adopted by researchers around the world. In the ensuing years, 
economists have developed computable OLG models that incor-
porate heterogeneous agents, realistic age-specific rates of fertility 
and mortality, multiple regions encompassing the global econo-
my, multiple traded and non-traded goods, international special-
isation, capital adjustment costs, region- and cohort-specific rates 
of technological change, immigration, labour supply as well as 
consumption decisions, unintended and intended bequests, in-
formality, educational choice, borrowing constraints, idiosyncrat-
ic wage rate uncertainty, robots, climate change, all manner of 
fiscal policies, and many other economic factors and issues.
Thanks to the work of Marcet (1988) and Judd, Maliar and Ma-
liar (2009), economists can also now simulate large-scale OLG 
models with aggregate shocks. Hasanhodzic and Kotikoff (2013), 
which includes 80 periods and major shocks to the economy’s 
productivity growth and capital deprecation rates, is the first such 
model. While their model is highly stylised, it provides a blueprint 
for the production of more realistic stochastic OLG models. Such 
models can be used to show how particular policies impact the 
distribution of welfare changes of current and future generations.
The Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff study is also important in so far as 
it indicates that even large shocks to the economy do not materi-
ally affect the intergenerational redistribution arising from policy 
changes. Stated differently, their study shows that OLG models 
without shocks – which are easier to simulate and can more readi-
ly handle complex economic factors – can provide good estimates 
for the generational redistribution arising in models with shocks, 
even large ones. The intuition is that each generation lives for 
many years. Hence even large, serially correlated annual shocks 
tend to cancel out over time. Moreover, contemporaneous gener-
ations can share these risks with one another via bond and other 
financial markets.
The two-period OLG model became a workhorse in 
economics because of its ease of use and exposition. 
But it also stimulated interest in developing and solving 
more realistic models in which agents lived for periods 
corresponding to years.
[Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)] showed that, regardless 
of how governments characterise policies that take from 
the young and give to the old, such policies can affect 
major welfare losses on successive generations, both 
 through their direct fiscal and indirect general-equili-
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Assessing the two intergenerational frameworks
The two intergenerational frameworks, briefly reviewed above, 
continue to compete for economists’ consideration and use. The 
single-agent, infinitely lived, implicitly intergenerationally al-
truistic model has become the mainstay of the real business cy-
cle literature in macroeconomics. This literature focuses on the 
economy’s response to shocks, which are computationally much 
easier to handle with the assumption of a single representative 
agent. The life-cycle model has, for its part, primarily been used 
in deterministic settings to study dynamic feedback effects of pol-
icy changes as well as the interconnected impacts of changes in 
 demographics.
The ability of the life-cycle model to handle economic as well 
as policy shocks, as demonstrated in Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff 
(2013), will likely lead more macro economists to work on the 
life-cycle model. The reason is the strong evidence, accumulat-
ed over the years, against operative intergenerational altruism. 
Micro studies by Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992, 1997) 
and Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff (1996) show that extended 
families share neither their resources nor shocks to their resources 
when it comes to determining how much each extended family 
member should consume. Rather than acting like a unitary fam-
ily, parents and their adult children consume, in the main, as if 
they were unrelated.
Altruism has also been strongly rejected in cohort data in a study 
by Abel and Kotlikoff (1994). And Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabel-
haus (1996) and Lee and Mason (2011) show remarkable shifts 
through time in favour of the elderly in the US profile of average 
consumption – shifts which coincide with major and ongoing 
redistribution from younger to older generations.3 In the early 
1960s, the US age-consumption profile was hump-shaped, peak-
ing at roughly age 50. Today it is an upward sloping line. These 
robust findings against operational intergenerational altruism are 
complemented by strong findings by Browning et al. (2011) and 
others against operational altruism between spouses within mar-
riages.
Direct measurement of intergenerational justice
There are many aspects of intergenerational justice which eco-
nomics is just beginning to examine in computable general equi-
librium simulation models. An example is the impact of climate 
change on the welfare of future generations. When this research is 
completed, it will provide qualitative and quantitative assessments 
of the range of impacts that current climate policy may have on 
future generations.
To date, most of the direct measurement of intergenerational 
justice has centred around the fiscal treatment of current versus 
future generations. This has taken the form of fiscal gap and gen-
erational accounting.4 Fiscal gap accounting focuses on the gov-
ernment’s intertemporal budget constraint, which requires that 
the present value of a government’s expenditures, no matter how 
labelled, equals the present value of its receipts, no matter how 
they too are labelled. The fiscal gap measures the extent to which 
expenditures exceed taxation valued in the present.5
To illustrate fiscal gap accounting, consider the current US fed-
eral government’s fiscal gap. It is massive, totalling roughly $200 
 trillion.6 Since US GDP is close to $20 trillion, the US fiscal 
gap represents 10 years of current US GDP or 10.5% of GDP 
through the infinite horizon.7 Eliminating the US fiscal gap via 
tax hikes would require an immediate and permanent 53% in-
crease in all federal taxes or, alternatively, a 33% immediate and 
permanent cut in all federal expenditures, including those the US 
government labels as “official debt service”.
Waiting to make fiscal adjustments makes the size of the requisite 
adjustments even larger. And the longer the government waits to 
address its generational problem, the larger will be the number of 
older generations allowed to consume through the end of their 
lives without having to pay more in taxes or receive less in ben-
efits. This, in turn, means a larger fiscal burden that will be im-
posed on today’s young and future generations over the course of 
their lifetimes.
Generational accounting is an extension of fiscal gap accounting. 
It was introduced by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) 
to measure the burden on future generations of balancing the 
government’s intertemporal budget (eliminating the fiscal gap) 
assuming current generations are entirely exempted from helping 
eliminate a country’s fiscal gap. Based on current US fiscal policy, 
future generations face lifetime net tax rates (the present value of 
lifetime net taxes divided by the present value of lifetime labour 
earnings) that are some 70% higher than those today’s young 
 generations would face under maintenance of current law.8 
The huge US fiscal gap and generational bill being foisted on 
unborn Americans reflects the country’s demographics, its post-
war expansion of pension and healthcare benefits provided to the 
 elderly, and successive rounds of federal tax cuts not matched by 
reductions in defence and other discretionary federal spending.
American economists have strongly endorsed fiscal gap and gen-
erational accounting, as may be seen at www.theinformact.org. 
The Inform Act is a bipartisan bill that would compel three US 
government agencies – the Congressional Budget Office, the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, and the General Accountability 
Office – to do fiscal gap and generational accounting on a routine 
basis. The bill, which has received limited support in Congress 
and has not, therefore, been enacted, has been endorsed by 20 
American Nobel Laureates in Economics and over 1,300 Ameri-
can economists, primarily from academia.
Fortunately, other countries are taking the measurement of inter-
generational fiscal imbalances seriously. The creation of Norway’s 
Petroleum Fund (now called The Pension Fund Global) appears 
to have been strongly influenced by Auerbach, Gokhale, Kotlikoff 
and Steigum (1993) as well as Steigum et al. (1999). Both are gen-
erational accounting studies, which asked whether Norway was 
overconsuming its petroleum wealth.
The European Union is now producing fiscal gap measures for 
its member countries every three years. It references this measure 
as the S2 indicator. European Commission (2015) reports fiscal 
gaps for 10 of 26 member countries in excess of 3% of GDP on 
an ongoing basis. While far smaller than the 10.5% figure for 
the US, even 3% of GDP per year represents a very major fiscal 
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 imbalance.9 And, given the zero-sum nature of generational 
 accounting, the longer adjustment is delayed to eliminate these 
fiscal gaps, the larger the fiscal burden that will be left for today’s 
young as well as future generations.
Fiscal gap accounting, generational accounting or both have been 
done over the years by the IMF, the World Bank, Her Majes-
ty’s Treasury, the Bundes Bank, the New Zealand Treasury and 
many other institutions and government entities around the 
world, including, as mentioned, the European Commission. The 
list of countries that have engaged in fiscal gap or generational 
accounting, or an equivalent calculation, whether on a one-time 
or routine basis includes not just most members of the European 
Union, but also Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Russia, China, 
Japan, South Korea, Canada, Thailand, Chile, Brazil, El Salvador, 
the UK and the US.
A number of these studies are included in Generational Accounting 
Around the World, a 1999 National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) volume edited by Alan Auerbach, Laurence Kotlikoff 
and Willi Leibfritz. This volume also includes a study entitled 
 “Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium” by Hans Fehr 
and Laurence Kotlikoff, which shows that general equilibrium 
effects can materially impact, but not fundamentally alter, the 
picture of generational equity produced by standard partial equi-
librium generational accounting.
The critique of deficit accounting
The strong global interest in fiscal gap and generational account-
ing reflects, in large part, the realisation that convention deficit 
and debt accounting do not constitute meaningful measurements 
of the fiscal burdens being foisted on young and future gener-
ations. Feldstein’s (1974) introduction of the concept of Social 
Security wealth made clear that the US government was keeping 
liabilities of various kinds off its books, i.e. liabilities that weren’t 
being recorded as US official debt.
But the problem Feldstein discovered ran and runs far deeper than 
the well-known fact that governments don’t disclose everything 
they owe. As Kotlikoff (1986, 1988, 1993, 2002, Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987), and Green and Kotlikoff (2009) show, govern-
ment debt is not theoretically well-defined. Instead, the debt and 
its change through time, the deficit, reflect economically arbitrary 
choices of how to label government receipts and payments.
Indeed, Green and Kotlikoff (2009) provide a general proof that 
fiscal policy can be arbitrarily labelled to permit governments to 
report any time path of official debt (positive or negative) regard-
less of the government’s underlying fiscal policy. Their proof holds 
for all neoclassical models with rational agents, i.e. agents who are 
not fooled and whose economic decisions are not influenced by 
the choice of language.
The Green and Kotlikoff study indicates that a country with a zero 
fiscal gap and a highly intergenerationally just fiscal policy could, 
via the choice of fiscal labels, nonetheless project a path of official 
debt that perpetually rises relative to the economy. Alternatively, 
the country could have a large and growing fiscal gap and state 
that it has a surplus (negative official debt), whose projected value 
is rising through time. Again, all that’s needed to claim your coun-
try is fiscally responsible when the opposite is true is the adoption 
of the right, internally consistent labelling convention. Since the 
Green-Kotlikoff paper shows that all neoclassical models with 
 rational agents can be relabelled, the indeterminacy of the debt 
and the deficit is unrelated to market imperfections, adverse selec-
tion, moral hazard, distortionary taxation, liquidity constraints, 
uncertainty, monopoly, and all other economic issues that have 
been studied using economic models with rational agents.
In contrast to official debt and deficit numbers, the fiscal gap and 
lifetime net tax rate facing future generations that is needed to 
eliminate the fiscal gap, which generational accounting produces, 
are label-free measures; i.e. their values are the same regardless of 
the choice of fiscal-labelling convention.
The proposition that conventional debt measures are economically 
meaningless is a critically important finding when it comes to the 
measurement of intergenerational justice. Yes, economists largely 
understand the labelling problem; yes, fiscal gap and generational 
accounting are becoming standard methods of fiscal analysis in 
certain parts of the world; and yes, simulation studies of the fiscal/
demographic transition in large scale OLG models are becoming 
more frequent. But official debt and deficit accounting remains 
the central measuring rod for governments’ fiscal decision making 
as well as fiscal discourse. In the US, for example, the country’s 
long-term fiscal imbalance is rarely mentioned by politicians, 
whereas the size of the debt and deficit are routinely discussed. 
Since those numbers are both figments of language, not true eco-
nomic indicators, fiscal policy-making in the US and other coun-
tries is deeply irrational. International institutions, including the 
World Bank and the IMF, contribute to this problem by putting 
the debt and deficit front and centre in their discussions of fiscal 
sustainability.
This situation is akin to governments and international insti-
tutions basing decisions involving the physical world ignoring 
 relativity’s teaching that time and distance are effectively func-
tions of language (one’s frame of reference based on the direction 
and speed of travel). Just as the equations of physics do not pin 
down unique measures of time and distance, the equations of ne-
oclassical economics do not pin down measures of the debt and 
the deficit or, for that matter, taxes and transfer payments. The 
“accounting” of such “concepts” is, unfortunately, content-free.
Conclusion
The ongoing use of official debt to consider fiscal sustainability 
and, implicitly, to assess intergenerational justice is without sci-
entific merit. The economics profession has the primary respon-
sibility to make this clear to the general public, the press, and 
All that’s needed to claim your country is fiscally 
 responsible when the opposite is true is the adoption of 
the right, internally consistent labelling convention.
Given the zero-sum nature of generational accounting, 
the longer adjustment is delayed to eliminate these 
fiscal gaps, the larger the fiscal burden that will be left 
for today’s young as well as future generations.
Just as the equations of physics do not pin down 
unique measures of time and distance, the equations 
of neoclassical economics do not pin down measures 
of the debt and the deficit or, for that matter, taxes and 
transfer payments.
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the politicians. We cannot meaningfully discuss intergenerational 
justice by resorting to measures that purport to bear on this ques-
tion but do nothing of the kind. Economists are aware of this 
problem but need to be much more vigorous in educating the 
general public and, ultimately, policy-makers to focus on fiscal 
reality not linguistics.
In discussing intergenerational justice, economists would do 
well to point to the lesson of Argentina, which, a century back, 
had one of the world’s highest levels of per capita GDP. Today 
Argentina’s per capital GDP is less than a quarter of that in the 
US. Argentina’s long-term, generational decline in relative, if not 
absolute, living standards, doesn’t reflect immutable productivi-
ty shocks, natural disasters, or sustained changes in its terms of 
trade. It reflects, from all appearances, a century of poor govern-
ance, which enriched politicians, internal power groups and cur-
rent generations at the expense of long-term economic growth 
and the welfare of future Argentines. Any fair-minded observer 
of Argentina’s history of fiscal, monetary, and other policies must 
conclude that its long–term economic decline represents a case 
study in intergenerational injustice.10
While the US has a far more stable democracy and far better ad-
herence to the rule of law, its fiscal policy is slowly but surely 
taking future generations down the path of Argentina. A country’s 
fiscal gap is measured in present value. As such, it is like a house-
hold’s credit card bill, which grows with interest when left unpaid. 
America’s fiscal gap is not being officially acknowledged, let alone 
being eliminated. Indeed, it is growing at roughly $6 trillion per 
year! But the US is not alone in leaving massive unpaid bills to 
the unborn. Other countries, including Japan, China, Russia, and 
at least 10 EU member countries, are engaged in a fierce, ongoing 
generational policy of take as you go.
Looking long-term, measurement of generational injustice will 
likely rely less on fiscal gap and generational accounting and more 
on the results of Monte Carlo simulations of large-scale, highly 
detailed life-cycle models, which feature uncertainty and incorpo-
rate not just intergenerational redistribution through fiscal policy 
but the truly mega issues of generational equity, namely climate 
change and nuclear proliferation.
As Weitzman (2009) points out, our posterior probability dis-
tributions of catastrophic events arising from such planetary life 
and death issues have fat tails because we have such limited in-
formation on their likelihood. Given this, the next generation of 
dynamic and, thus, intergenerational models will need to incor-
porate disaster distributions that feature, to the extent possible, 
not only our uncertainty about things we know but also our igno-
rance about things we don’t know.
Cai et al. (2013) is indicative of how quickly economics is moving 
to refine and expand its modelling in the area of climate change. 
Their model counts among the first to seriously incorporate both 
uncertainty about climate change damage and the potential for 
climate-change tipping points. They show, as Weitzman suggest-
ed, that uncertainty greatly strengthens the case for immediate and 
strong climate-change mitigation in the form of the imposition of 
far higher carbon taxes than have previously been suggested. This 
research makes clear that the future of measuring intergeneration-
al justice and determining policies to achieve intergenerational 
justice lies in stochastic, dynamic modelling that simultaneously 
captures all major interacting factors.
Measuring intergenerational justice is, of course, only the first 
step in achieving generational justice. As described above, many 
countries have pursued and are pursing policies that pose tremen-
dous risks – fiscal, environmental, and, arguably, existential risks 
– to our descendants. This is passing strange in a world where 
parents universally proclaim their children to be their most pre-
cious possession. The measurement of intergenerational justice is 
now moving at an accelerating pace. Whether it is matched with 
the rapid actions needed to protect the welfare of our collective 
progeny remains to be seen.
Notes
1 Auerbach/Kotlikoff/Koehler (2016) provides a new method for 
measuring intragenerational inequality. 
2 O’Driscoll (1977) provides a full description of Ricardo’s asser-
tion and immediate rejection of “Ricardian Equivalence”. 
3 In 1970, payments to Medicare, Social Security and Medicaid 
(70% of which goes to the poor elderly) per oldster (person 65 
and older) equalled 37% of per capital GDP. Today the ratio is 
close to 70%. 
4 Generational accounting references a specific framework devel-
oped by the author, Alan Auerbach and Jagadeesh Gokhale (see 
Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991)), to calculate and char-
acterise fiscal burdens being left to future generations assuming 
currently living generations do not contribute to eliminating the 
fiscal gap. Generational accounting, as formalised in Auerbach, 
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991), does not capture other net bur-
dens, such as climate degradation, that current generations im-
pose on future generations. The generational accounting frame-
work has been modified by other researchers to, for example, 
allocate, by generation, the benefits of public goods spending and 
to examine the fiscal treatment of future generations in all or some 
of the fiscal gap that is closed via additional net taxes levied on 
current generations (see, for example, Raffelhüschen and Walliser 
(1996) and Bonin (2013)).
5 Governments cannot escape satisfying their intertemporal 
budget constraints since doing so would imply that a country 
could consume more than its resources, where consumption and 
resources are both measured in present value. Hence, fiscal gap ac-
counting is an inherently partial equilibrium analysis showing the 
need for fiscal adjustment, while leaving open the means of fiscal 
adjustment. Practically speaking, a government that attempted to 
maintain a positive fiscal gap indefinitely would find itself trying 
to extract more than 100% of the resources of the young to trans-
Just as the equations of physics do not pin down 
unique measures of time and distance, the equations 
of neoclassical economics do not pin down measures 
of the debt and the deficit or, for that matter, taxes and 
transfer payments.
Measuring intergenerational justice is, of course, only 
the first step in achieving generational justice. [Many] 
countries have pursued and are pursing policies that 
pose tremendous risks – fiscal, environmental, and, 
arguably, existential risks – to our descendants. This 
is passing strange in a world where parents univer-
sally proclaim their children to be their most precious 
 possession.
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fer to the old or to the government. This produces “game over”, 
which is illustrated in Evans, Kotlikoff and Phillips (2012). 
6 Author’s calculations based on projections of the Congressional 
Budget Office.
7 I.e. the present value of 10.5% of GDP projected over the in-
finite horizon equals roughly $200 trillion.
8 Estimate by author.
 9 To get a sense of the size of 3% of GDP, note that 3% is roughly 
the ratio of US Social Security benefits (paid for, in part, by a 
12.4% payroll tax) to US GDP.
10 See Cavallo and Runde (2017) for an outstanding review of 
20th- and 21st-century economic history.
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